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According to Th omas Nagel, the requirements of morality “are not imposed from outside, 
but refl ect our own disposition to view ourselves, and our need to accept ourselves, from 
outside. Without such acceptance we will be in a signifi cant way alienated from our lives” 
(Nagel 1986: 138).
Th is quotation hints at a solution to what I will call “Smith’s problem” aft er Michael 
Smith who has most clearly articulated it (M. Smith 1994). Th is problem maps onto the 
debate between the Kantian and the Humean traditions in ethics. Kantians argue that 
moral norms are grounded in reason. By exploring the very concepts of morality and 
freedom we discover that we cannot but give ourselves the moral law autonomously and 
that it would be inconsistent and self- defeating on the norms of rationality to will to 
perform an immoral action. In this way, reason can establish certain “moral facts” such 
as that giving a false promise would be wrong. But the problem here is that this discovery 
does not provide us with a motivation to do right and avoid evil. We may acknowledge 
the rationality of doing right without being motivated to do so, just as I may acknowledge 
the rationality of taking an umbrella on a day when rain is expected but decide, in a devil- 
may- care mood, not to do so. If considerations of rational prudence can be ignored, how 
much more could the facts of morality be ignored? And besides, one does not act morally 
just in order to avoid being irrational.
From the Humean side, the problem is a mirror image of this. For Hume, reason does 
not motivate. Only desires do. An action is caused by a combination of a relevant belief 
with a suitable desire. So in order to do right and avoid evil we must desire to do so. 
Reason can only show us the means. Caring and sympathy for others may count among 
our desires and it is to be applauded when they do, since this will lead to welcome social 
and personal outcomes, but there is nothing normative or compelling about those or any 
other desires. Th ere are no “moral facts” here: no rationally grounded beliefs about what 
is right or wrong. Th ere are only feelings of sympathy and caring. But these are fl eeting 
and contingent and, moreover, they are not linked to moral beliefs. Th e absence of relevant 
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and well- grounded beliefs here means that moral motivation appears not only fl eeting 
but also arbitrary. We will act benevolently just to those people whom we happen to care 
about. Even a general and impartial point of view, while perhaps indicating what is right, 
may not guarantee the necessary motivation to do right.
What is needed to overcome the lack of inclination in the Kantian picture and the lack 
of rational warrant in the Humean conception is an internal relation between a rational 
belief that an action is right and an eff ective motivation to perform it. I will argue in 
this chapter that we need virtue in order to forge this required internal relation between 
reasons and motivations. I will argue that, in its most general sense, being virtuous involves 
being motivated to act in accordance with internalized identity- confi rming norms in 
ways appropriate to one’s situation so as to express and confi rm one’s identity as a socially 
formed, responsible agent. As Nagel might put it, virtue stems from a concern not to be 
alienated from one’s life.
SELF- CONSTITUTION
Th ere have been several recent attempts to solve Smith’s problem. Christine Korsgaard, in 
her recent book, Self- constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, argues against “dogmatic 
rationalists” who “believe that norms exist outside of human reason – they arise from 
Objective Values or Moral Facts or some sort of rational structure that exists ‘out there’ 
in the universe” (Korsgaard 2009: 6). Th ese views founder on Smith’s problem because 
they do not explain why we feel we should adhere to these norms. Th e “necessitation”, 
or feeling that an action is to be done, that we feel when acting morally does not take the 
form of obedience to an external reason or command. Instead, the moral life “is not the 
struggle to be rational or to be good. It is, instead, the ongoing struggle for integrity, the 
struggle for psychic unity, the struggle to be, in the face of psychic complexity, a single 
unifi ed agent” (ibid.: 7).1
Korsgaard begins her argument by making a distinction between an act and an action. 
What matters here is the description being given to the action. An event is described as 
an act when there is no consideration given to the agent’s purpose, while a description of 
an action includes the purpose or end being sought. So when moral theorists talk about 
making promises, say, they are describing acts, whereas when they draw a scenario in 
which a person makes a promise in order to gain some advantage, they are describing an 
action. In this way an agent’s reasons are built into the action description. Th e reason for 
an action is not a pre- existing mental state that gives the act a point or a moral quality 
and which could be thought separately from the act. It is inherent in the action as its 
purpose. Th e action description expresses the internal coherence of the agent’s reasons 
and motivations.2
It is because actions are described in this holistic way that they are so intimate to the 
identity of their agents. Th e purposes that give actions the moral quality that they have 
belong to the agents and express their identities – including their states of virtue and 
their practical rationality. As Korsgaard puts it, “there is no you prior to your choices 
and actions, because your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and 
actions” (ibid.: 19). Accordingly she adds, “We are each faced with the task of construct-
ing a peculiar, individual kind of identity – personal or practical identity – that the other 
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animals lack” (ibid.: 19–20). Moreover, the identity that we construct for ourselves makes 
certain actions worthwhile. In acting as a mother or as a teacher I adopt the norms that 
these roles contain along with my identity. I will leave aside whether the individualist vol-
untarism inherent in this thesis is consistent with theories of social formation of the self 
beloved of more communitarian thinkers. Whatever the source of our identity – whether 
we acquire it through our socialization, or whether we construct it as an existential project, 
or whether both processes are at work dialectically – the link between it and the reasons 
that we think make an action worthwhile will be very close.
Given Smith’s problem, it would be diffi  cult to understand how we could act from 
principles. Accordingly, Korsgaard interprets Kant as distinguishing between acting from 
incentives and acting in accordance with principles. Th e notion of an incentive here is 
that of an object in the world which, in my way of understanding the world, attracts me 
in some way so as to elicit a desire or motivation within me. “An incentive is a motivation-
ally loaded representation of an object” (ibid.: 104–5). When I act on principle and help a 
friend at some cost to myself, what is my incentive for doing that? It is not Kant’s respect 
for the Law. Korsgaard suggests it is my desire to express and enhance my identity as a 
friend. It is my wish to fulfi l my role as a friend that motivates my acting in accordance 
with the relevant principles of friendship. Th is solves Smith’s problem in relation to the 
norms inherent in the many forms of life and related identities that I occupy. Th ere are 
norms inherent in being a mother, a teacher or a friend and I establish and preserve those 
identities in myself by acting in accordance with those norms or, as we can now say, from 
those norms. Th e link between those norms and my identity makes them motivational 
incentives for me.
But Korsgaard expands this view to suggest that, when we dig down beyond all our 
relatively transparent purposes and motivations, our deepest incentive is to create our 
identity as a unifi ed and integrated agent. Th is identity is, at base, the identity of a rational 
agent willing and able to follow the dictates of practical reason. As Korsgaard puts it, “In 
valuing ourselves as the bearers of contingent practical identities, knowing, as we do, that 
these identities are contingent, we are also valuing ourselves as rational beings” (ibid.: 24). 
And she adds, “Th e necessity of conforming to the principles of practical reason comes 
down to the necessity of being a unifi ed agent” (ibid.: 25).
But is this theory confi rmed phenomenologically? Most oft en we would help a friend 
because we see that they are in need of help. It is my being their friend that allows me to 
see the need and that motivates me to respond to it. In such cases there may not be much 
explicit entertainment of reasons at all. On other occasions we may explicitly think that 
we should help a friend because that would be what my being a friend requires of me. 
But it is not oft en that I express the necessity I feel to help a friend by saying that I must 
do so in order to honour my identity as a rational agent. Th is would be a classic example 
of Bernard Williams’s “one thought too many” (B. Williams 1981b: 18). However, there 
is nothing in Korsgaard’s account that suggests that this incentive or motivation must 
be a conscious reason or a desire. We are less transparent to ourselves than that. What 
Korsgaard is pointing to is a level in our motivational sets of which we are not usually 
conscious. Th ere are other more obvious and more “surface” matters that constitute my 
purposes and it is these that give my actions their moral quality. But the origin of the 
incentive or deep motivation with which I act is my existential concern to be a rational 
and unifi ed agent.
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However, Korsgaard’s notion of identity as a rational and unifi ed agent seems remark-
ably thin.3 It has no phenomenology at all. Our constituting ourselves as unifi ed rational 
agents by acting rationally is not a purpose that we entertain in any sense that is phenom-
enologically available to us. While there might be extreme circumstances such as acting 
under torture, when we question whether what we did when we surrendered vital infor-
mation was truly done in a voluntary way or whether it was an act wrung from us under 
extreme duress, we do not normally seek to establish ourselves consciously as a rational 
agent of our actions. Being a rational agent does not contribute to my sense of identity. It 
is simply presupposed by it. It would seem then that my identity purely as a rational agent 
is a Kantian theoretical construct.
However, I do not think that this is a problem for the use that I am making of 
Korsgaard’s thesis. Th at it is not available phenomenologically prevents this quest from 
being a Humean desire and therefore escapes the charge of contingency levelled against 
such desires. Rather, it is what we might call a necessary condition for agency. All of our 
actions arise from a deep quest for rational unity in our motivational sets. Th is condition is 
now seen as a dynamic, existential quest which occurs below the level of self- consciousness 
but which we must posit as a real and eff ective element in our motivational sets in order 
to make sense of the phenomenon of necessitation. Beneath the many layers of our thick 
identity as a mother, teacher or friend there needs to be this primordial and usually uncon-
scious quest for the realization of our very humanity as a rational and integrated agent. 
While Korsgaard uses both Kantian and Platonic concepts to explicate this quest, so that 
it is both a quest to be true to our rationality and a quest to be internally ordered, the key 
point is that it unites the rational perception of what we are called upon to do in the world 
with the existential motivation to order and unify ourselves by doing it.
What Korsgaard has achieved is the identifi cation of an existential, primordial level 
of caring about one’s own identity as a rational agent. But, up to this point, this has no 
moral signifi cance. It applies equally to all cases of practical necessitation. Someone may 
feel that they simply must buy that vintage guitar on eBay. Gauguin felt that he had to go 
to Polynesia to pursue his painterly vocation at the expense of his family.4 Indeed, if it is 
constitutive of the moral point of view to care about others, then Korsgaard’s quest would 
seem to be antithetical to virtue. While caring about one’s own identity is not selfi sh in 
the sense of being constituted by desires and motivations that seek the satisfaction of one’s 
own preferences at the expense of others, it is self- centred. Even as it seeks to fulfi l the 
other- directed requirements of mothering, teaching or being a friend, it does so in order 
to establish and maintain the agent’s identity as a mother, teacher or friend and, through 
these social roles, that agent’s identity as a rational person.
Indeed, Charles Larmore has off ered a critique of an earlier version of Korsgaard’s 
account that appeared in her book Th e Sources of Normativity (Korsgaard 1996). In this 
text Korsgaard reiterates Kant’s claim that it is the self- legislation of pure reason that justi-
fi es the claims that morality makes on us. However, according to Larmore: “If principles of 
conduct draw their authority from reason’s legislating for itself, and not from its respond-
ing to the reasons there are, then the allegiance we owe to the claims of morality has to 
stem from a respect we feel for our own powers of rationality” (Larmore 2008: 115). But 
this does not refl ect the authentic meaning of the moral point of view. Th is meaning is 
that we see another’s good as a reason for action on our part. It is not that the norms upon 
which we should act serve to confi rm us as rational beings, but that we take the needs 
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and feelings of others into account in a direct and perceptual response to the real- world 
situations in which we fi nd ourselves. According to Larmore,
Our moral identity consists not in valuing our own humanity and thereby deter-
mining that we ought to value that of others, but in recognizing directly the reason 
there is to value humanity in whatever person it may happen to appear. It is a reason 
to love our neighbour in no less an immediate fashion than we are naturally moved 
to care about ourselves. (Ibid.: 122)
In her later text Korsgaard responds to this critique and attempts to give virtue- ethical 
relevance to her thesis by using Plato’s doctrine that a morally bad action is one that 
stems from a disordered soul. Plato famously drew analogies between the way in which a 
state is governed and the way in which persons govern themselves. From this Korsgaard 
draws the lesson that rational action should be described using not the confl ict model 
in which reason suppresses the other parts of the soul, but the constitutional model, in 
which reasons act as the ordering element so as to produce an ordered and unifi ed self 
who can own the action as its rational agent. As she puts it, “necessitation does exist in 
the Platonic soul, but it does not take the form of active, forcible repression. It is simply 
the work of government – the constant and everyday fact of coercive constitutional 
rule” (Korsgaard 2009: 147). What this analogy suggests is that the goal of the self is the 
maintenance of its inner order and thus of its identity as a principle- led rational agent. 
Korsgaard uses the several kinds of bad constitution that Plato had described as models 
for what can go wrong in the constitutional model of action she proposes to suggest 
that doing bad things is oft en a case of not being in charge of oneself. Th e moral law 
is the law of the unifi ed constitution. Accordingly, “Both Plato and Kant think that the 
principle, the one that really unifi es us, and renders us autonomous, is also the principle 
of the morally good person. According to Plato and Kant, integrity in the metaphysical 
sense – the unity of agency – and in the moral sense – goodness – are one and the same 
property” (ibid.: 176).
As if realizing that this response is still too narcissistic, Korsgaard goes on to argue 
that an agent with integrity is one who can take the reasons and purposes of another as 
a reason for herself – as opposed to simply using the other’s reasons as a means to her 
own purposes. Th is articulates the Kantian prohibition against using another as a means. 
To have achieved my identity as an ordered rational agent is to live in a world in which 
the reasons of others – their needs and legitimate desires – are incentives for me, just as it 
is, as Larmore had argued, a world in which those needs and desires are reasons for me. 
Calling these reasons incentives solves Smith’s problem, and acknowledging the reasons 
of others as reasons for me solves the moral relevance problem. Korsgaard concludes that, 
“Responding to another’s reasons as normative is the default position – just like hearing 
another’s words as meaningful is the default position. It takes work to ignore someone 
else’s reasons; it’s nearly as hard to be bad as it is to be good. And that’s because reasons 
are public” (ibid.: 202). It is in this way that personal integrity in Korsgaard’s sense equates 
with moral goodness and virtue.
Th e problem with this account, however, is that it is still the wrong thing that seems 
to be at stake when we act morally. For Korsgaard, what is at stake is one’s identity as a 
rational agent and – which she says comes to the same thing – one’s integrity as a moral 
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agent. In Kantian terms this is my humanity as a self- legislator of the Law. However, 
Larmore is surely right when he says that this is not what morality is about. It is about not 
putting yourself fi rst. Morality is an expression of our caring about others. It involves a 
deep level of caring directed upon others which comes to concrete expression in specifi c 
experiences of sympathy, specifi c acts of kindness and the avoidance of causing specifi c 
kinds of harm. Korsgaard’s reply establishes only that it is acceptable to say that identity 
and integrity are all that morality is about because the concerns of other people are inex-
tricably bound up with the agent’s identity and integrity.
But I suspect that this would only be true for a virtuous agent. Gauguin seemed to be 
quite rational and integrated. Yet he was able to reject the call of his family upon him in 
order to pursue his integrity as an artist. So we need a better account of how the concern 
for others becomes an internal reason for virtuous agents. Perhaps Korsgaard’s basis for 
necessitation is just too thin, abstract and primordial to provide a substantive conception 
of virtue. A substantive account would embrace the multitude of concerns and responsi-
bilities – including those directed upon others – that a worldly agent has.
ETHICAL FORMATION
In her text Ethical Formation, Sabina Lovibond off ers a diff erent way of overcoming Smith’s 
problem. She also calls for an “internal” relationship between one’s rationally grounded 
moral beliefs and one’s moral actions, “meaning that the condition of being motivated to 
act is (somehow) contained, or implicit, in that of sincerely believing the relevant action 
to be called for” (Lovibond 2002: 3). If Lovibond’s internal relationship holds, a belief that 
is sincerely held would lead fairly readily – absent any form of akrasia – to its being acted 
upon. If such a belief were about reasons in the world it might provide the means of over-
coming the apparent narcissism of Korsgaard’s account. It would also convert subjective 
necessitation into genuine normativity. But notice that this sincere practical belief need 
not be true on the basis of a “view from nowhere”. A “truth” in this sense – obtained by an 
impartial or ideal observer – would heighten Smith’s problem rather than solve it since it 
would disengage the practical belief from the motivational set of the agent.
Lovibond argues that a virtuous person is one who is sensitive to the reasons for acting 
morally which have a reality out there in the world in a form that allows them to be 
responded to.5 Not unlike Korsgaard, Lovibond rejects what she calls “the priority of psy-
chology” (ibid.: 5), such as the Humean view that we need to feel sympathy or caring for 
others in order to be motivated to act well. Rather, moral motivation arises from “a certain 
species of rationality” (ibid.) which allows the virtuous person to see the reasons that are 
already there in the world: “a world in which the reasons why something is valued by one 
person are in principle, even if not immediately, accessible to another” (ibid.: 6). Lovibond 
suggests that this recognition of values and reasons in the world requires sensitivity on 
the agent’s part and that this sensitivity is an aspect of that agent’s virtue. Whereas most 
virtue ethicists approach virtue as a character ideal understood as a set of dispositions 
or traits which are either expressed directly in action or less directly in emotions and 
ethical commitments, Lovibond gives the notion of virtue a more rationalist reading. As 
she puts it: “Virtue ethics, then, can be seen as aiming at the elucidation of the rationalist 
character ideal as it relates to practical rationality, and within practical rationality, to the 
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proper appreciation of those (potentially action- guiding) values that lie beyond the range 
of ordinary self- interest” (ibid.: 13).
Th is rationalist reading involves not just an ideal of virtuous character and practice, 
but also an epistemological ideal centred on correct judgement. Inspired by Aristotle, 
Lovibond stresses the role of phronēsis understood as sensitive and appropriate judge-
ment as to the moral values and demands inherent in an agent’s situation. According to 
Lovibond, our world always already contains values: values which are there to be appre-
hended and responded to, rather than values we have created and then projected into 
the world. Because these values or reasons are always already there we are inserted into 
a space of reasons.
It is this thesis that overcomes Smith’s problem. Rather than there being an internal 
existential quest for rational unity which relates subjective reasons to motivations, the 
world already contains values and, as worldly beings, our responses to those values are 
always already motivated. Accordingly, Lovibond gives great attention to explaining how 
these values can be understood to exist objectively. She says we should not seek to step 
outside of our world and theorize it “sideways on” as if we could grasp the relation between 
mind and world as a separate object of enquiry. While the moral realities to which the 
virtuous person is sensitive are socially constructed, she does not appeal to sociology 
to account for this. Rather, she alludes to Aristotle’s account of the formation of virtue 
in which a person moves from being taught to act in accordance with virtue and then 
acquires the internal disposition to act for the sake of virtue. Th is process is not just dis-
positional but also cognitive. At some point the agent moves from reacting appropriately 
to morally salient stimuli to being able to understand what those stimuli are and what 
responses they require from her. Just as one is inserted into a linguistic space by one’s 
upbringing, so too one is inserted into the space of moral reasons that constitutes moral-
ity. Having been trained in the habit of acting virtuously one gradually comes to acquire 
the skill of picking out what is morally important. A fully formed moral subject “knows 
how to go on” in a morally salient situation. Th e fully developed moral agent is able to 
pick out morally relevant features in her world and act appropriately in response to them.
But will she be motivated to do so? Lovibond argues that a coherent motivational 
form is gradually given to the reactions and attitudes of those who are shaped by their 
societies. Following John McDowell (1994), she refers to this as our “second nature” built 
upon the unstructured impulses of our “fi rst nature”. Our fi rst nature consists of all our 
pre- moral drives, appetites and impulses, most of which will be self- seeking but some of 
which will also be instinctively sociable – including such impulses as arise from sexual 
relations, friendships and family ties – while our second nature is our socialized self. It 
is this socialized self which is the agent of virtuous action and the subject of our rational 
and moral judgements. Given our communitarian second nature, the moral forms that 
our moral communities impart to us allow us to affi  rm ourselves as the persons we are in 
the context of our societies, and to express our inclinations in forms acceptable to, and 
structured by, our surrounding culture.
Th e charge of cultural relativism which might arise in response to this account is 
addressed by Lovibond in her suggestion that, although there is relativism here, there is 
also objectivity. It is not voluntary agreement which establishes this objectivity. Rather, it 
is the pre- conscious processes of acculturation and, as a result, persons emerge into the 
social world fi nding norms and values which are always already there. Objectivity comes 
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about because the processes of social formation build rules which we then experience as 
binding: just as arithmetic rules are learnt in inchoate ways as part of a non- self- conscious 
learning process but nevertheless produce objectively valid standards for doing mathemat-
ics. As Lovibond puts it:
If we are going to point to immersion in a culture as the material basis of our sense 
of value and of its normative bearing on action, then it would seem that we remain 
committed to a character ideal inextricably linked with the concept of form – a 
concept that reappears in the setting of “relaxed” (nonreductive) naturalism in the 
guise of the ethically signifi cant form to which the virtuous person is attuned.  
 (Lovibond 2002: 62)
Although she appeals to Plato to explicate the concept of “form” that she is using here, 
she is not alluding to a transcendent reality or to a view from nowhere. Rather, the judge-
ments and ways of acting on the part of individuals in a community collectively participate 
in, and contribute to, the traditions and way of life of that community, including its moral 
norms. Th is way of life then constitutes the quasi- Platonic form of which those judgements 
and actions are an expression. While this degree of objectivity may not satisfy all moral 
realists, it will be suffi  cient for my argument and, indeed, may be as much objectivity as 
any virtue- ethical theory has available to it.
Pursuing her rejection of the priority of psychology in her account of practical ration-
ality, Lovibond rejects any appeal to metaphysical entities such as free will or even self- 
conscious intentions housed in a mind. For her, to act morally is not to give oneself the 
moral law so as to constitute one’s freedom, or to be driven by benevolent sentiments such 
as caring. It is to express one’s socially formed values in action. While the cynical may 
see the existential quest which motivates such expression as a will to conformity, a more 
generous reading would see it as motivated by a desire for belonging. I should add that 
this account explains, in a way that Korsgaard’s could not, our adherence to norms which 
are not rationally based, such as those of aesthetics or of religious dietary rules.
Lovibond departs from the Kantian concept of “autonomy” in favour of her own 
concept of “authorship”. Given the social pressures towards dissolution of self and given 
the co- presence and eff ectiveness of a fi rst nature and a second nature, our authorship 
is the creation of a unifi ed self out of the myriad infl uences that constitute that self. In 
this way we attest to our acceptance of the norms of our culture and also to our integrity 
as a discrete individual. We do not give ourselves the law so as to constitute ourselves as 
autonomous apart from, or in defi ance of, our socialization. Rather, we constitute our 
subjectivity by being the author of our actions from within the practical resources our 
culture gives us. Just as a writer can be an author even while using an established language 
which he has not given himself as a law, so a moral agent can use established community 
norms which she does not give herself as laws. Nevertheless, her authorship of her actions 
is genuine. Ethical training brings us to the point where we can do the right thing not just 
as imitators of others, but as authors of our own acts.
Lovibond sees authorship as an ethical notion in that it grounds accountability. We 
need to be able to represent ourselves to others as consistent and unifi ed. For Lovibond, 
this is what makes social life predictable and allows others to rely on us. However, as 
this is a somewhat instrumental account of authorship, I would highlight its existential 
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signifi cance. While it grounds our accountability to others, it also grounds our self- 
acceptance as unifi ed selves and responsible virtuous agents.
VIRTUE
What concept of virtue can we derive from all this? It will not be a specifi c concept such 
as that of courage, generosity or honesty. It is as yet too primordial to have a name. It will 
acquire specifi c names as it is realized in specifi c situations. It will not be a concept tied 
to that of “character” – a passive concept tied to explanatory and causal ways of thinking. 
It will be an existential concept and it will lie so deeply in our motivational make- up as 
to normally escape the scrutiny of refl ection. If it has a link to the concept of eudaimonia 
it will be through that of self- realization.6 And it will overcome the distinction between 
self- concern and concern for others which has been so crucial to identifying the moral 
point of view.
I have suggested in my commentary on Korsgaard’s thesis about identity and integrity 
and Lovibond’s thesis about authorship that there is an existential concern expressed in the 
ethical life. It is a concern to forge and express our unity as a moral agent and our integrity 
as a subject who is largely socially formed. Th is concern is not equivalent to a prudential 
concern in which we pursue our interests – possibly at the expense of those of others – 
but is a self- directed or agent- relative concern of a morally innocent kind. If our social 
formation turns the needs of others into incentives or into reasons for us to ameliorate 
their condition, we still need a basis from which to respond. We are not inert receptacles 
of morally loaded messages from the world. We are not cameras that can coldly record the 
suff ering of others. We have a responsive second nature. Just as our world contains reasons 
that are always already there, so our subjectivity – our authorship – contains concerns that 
are always already there. One of these will be our concern to be who we are.
But what Korsgaard has faintly shown, and Lovibond more strongly, is that who we 
are is not distinct from what we are morally concerned about. It is not detached from 
the norms and values that exist in our societies. Our social upbringing has made us into 
beings who see our good not just in our own identity but also in doing good for others. 
Indeed, Emmanuel Lévinas (1969) has argued that our concern and responsibility for 
others ground our very ontology as existential beings.7 It is through the concern of others 
for me that I have come to be. Accordingly, I have learnt what it is to be in a context from 
which caring for others cannot be removed. Th e virtuous stance which lies in the hidden 
heart of our authorship is a self- project8 concerned to establish, at one and the same time, 
our being as a unifi ed agent and our being as one concerned to meet the legitimate needs 
of others and to avoid doing them harm. I need those others in order for me to have the 
purposes that constitute my actions as mine and in order for them to constitute that 
meaningful world full of reasons for action in which I live.
Th is concept of virtue overcomes Smith’s problem. Virtue is an existential quest for self- 
realization that provides the internal link between reason and motivation so as to drive 
my practical engagement with the world. It grounds the necessitations out of which I act. 
It constitutes my motivated self and extends my concerns towards others. It is a necessary 
condition both for seeing moral facts and for being a moral agent. Seeing those facts is just 
as much an expression of my virtue as the motivated actions that would fl ow from it. In 
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this way, virtue is able to discriminate between practical necessitations which are of moral 
signifi cance and those which are not. Th e virtuous person sees the necessity of acquiring 
a rare guitar as morally insignifi cant and the necessity of pursuing art at the expense of 
family as morally dubious. If she is a Muslim, she sees the necessity of not eating pork as 
of a diff erent order of signifi cance from the necessity of being honest. My virtue is not 
only crucial for my quest for integrity, identity and belonging as a rational, social agent, 
but also for seeing others as objects of my concern and for seeing their needs as reasons 
for responsive action – reasons that always already exist objectively in my world.
NOTES
 1. It should be noted that in mentioning “integrity” Korsgaard is not alluding to the specifi c virtue that 
involves staying true to one’s commitments.
 2. Th is echoes the “expression theory of action” theorized by philosophers like Charles Taylor (1979; 1985; 
1989: ch. 21).
 3. I am using the terms “thick” and “thin” in the sense that Michael Walzer (1994) uses them.
 4. Th is example is discussed by Bernard Williams in his essay “Moral Luck” (1981a).
 5. Th is is a view not unlike that presented by Christine Swanton (2003).
 6. Th is may also provide a link to Nietzsche’s concept of will- to- power as explicated by Swanton, this volume, 
Chapter 9.
 7. I discuss Lévinas’s relevance to virtue ethics in my Understanding Virtue Ethics (2006b). See also Rom 
Harré (1983: 248ff .).
 8. I explicate this notion of “self- project” in van Hooft  (1995).
